Club提要：随着国际环境的深刻变化，软实力的内涵和作用正在发生深刻转变。它早已不只是文化吸引力和价值观影响力的体现，而越来越与战略竞争、供应链安全和制度韧性等现实议题紧密相连。北京对话联合创始人、秘书长韩桦应邀在瓦尔代国际辩论俱乐部（Valdai Discussion Club）官网发表英文文章《软实力的未来——基于霍尔木兹、乌克兰、中俄媒体等案例研究》（The Future of Soft Power in the Bilateral Dialogue Between Russia and China: Case Studies from Hormuz, Ukraine, RT/CGTN/TV BRICS, the Arctic, and the Belt and Road Initiative），以霍尔木兹海峡、乌克兰冲突、中俄媒体合作、北极治理和“一带一路”等案例为切入点，探讨中俄软实力协作的特点及其背后逻辑。文章认为，当今国际竞争已不再以硬实力或软实力来简单划分，而更多体现为叙事塑造、制度建立和网络建设等综合能力的竞争。
韩桦在瓦尔代国际辩论俱乐部发文。自2004年成立以来，瓦尔代国际辩论俱乐部已成为俄罗斯与世界对话的重要窗口。每年秋季，俱乐部在俄罗斯境内举办年度会议，俄罗斯总统通常会亲自出席并发表主旨演讲，就国际形势、俄罗斯外交政策及全球治理等重大问题阐述官方立场。（图源：瓦尔代俱乐部官网）
（翻译｜李琛峣）
约瑟夫・奈最早提出“软实力”概念，意指国家通过吸引力而非强制力塑造他国叙事偏好和行为取向的能力。冷战后，西方国家（尤其是美欧）凭借对媒体和文娱产业、高等教育与多边治理机构的掌控，占据着全球软实力主导地位。
但是，自2010 年代中期以来，软实力运作的环境发生结构性剧变。2014年开始的乌克兰危机、中美战略博弈加剧、新冠疫情及后续的全球供应链碎片化等，都使各国越来越将经济关系、供应链等相互依赖关系视为国家安全问题。渐渐的，软实力不再简单体现为文化吸引力或意识形态感召力，而是深度嵌入地缘政治竞争之中。
在这一背景下，中俄在对外传播与全球叙事构建上主动协同。两国并未复刻（也无法复刻）西方软实力扩张模式，而是立足主权、多极化、国家主导的信息与基础设施建设与治理，形成了全新的发展基础。
理解中俄软实力协作，应该超越软实力与硬实力的传统二分。在实践层面的影响力，通过整合叙事权力、制度权力与基础设施权力，正在日益发挥重要作用。
叙事权力，可理解为塑造全球事件解读方式的能力，危机时刻尤为关键。制度权力，意指参与并构建替代性治理框架的能力，如金砖国家、上海合作组织、亚投行、新发展银行等，以及中国的全球发展、安全、文明与治理四大倡议。基础设施权力，就是塑造互联互通的能力，包括能源管道、运输走廊、数字网络及北极航道等。
在中俄合作日益加深的大背景下，基础设施和互联互通塑造新叙事，新叙事为制度建设提供合理解读，制度建设反过来强化基础设施和互联互通。这种结构性融合在地缘政治舞台上表现得尤为明显。
霍尔木兹海峡与能源叙事权力的地缘政治
霍尔木兹海峡是全球最具战略敏感性的海上要道之一，全球相当大比例的石油与液化天然气出口经由此地。美以对伊朗军事行动以来，地区紧张局势不断升级，一再凸显全球能源安全体系的脆弱性。
在此背景下，中俄两国对于能源安全的认知日趋一致。能源安全并非单纯由市场机制决定，而是受到政治因素深刻塑造的结果。俄罗斯强调西方军事干预中东的破坏性后果，以及以制裁为手段的能源“治理”所带来的负面影响。中国强调能源供应渠道的多元化，并坚决反对单边强制性措施。
这种趋同认知建立在双方的结构性互补之上。作为受西方制裁的主要能源出口国，俄罗斯越来越依赖亚洲市场消化其能源出口；而作为全球最大的能源进口国，中国通过建设连接俄罗斯和中亚的管道以及依托“一带一路”打造的海陆能源走廊，系统性地实现了供应渠道的多元化。
在此过程中，中国的长期能源战略尤其值得关注。过去十年间，中国大幅扩充了战略石油储备，加快了可再生能源体系建设，并对电动汽车基础设施和电池技术投入巨资。这些结构性调整显著降低了中国对霍尔木兹等海上战略通道的依赖。与此同时，俄罗斯也借助亚洲市场更加稳定的长期需求，增强了能源出口韧性。
因此，霍尔木兹危机实际上成为强化中俄协同能源叙事的催化剂。在这一叙事中，由西方主导的海上能源安全体系肉眼可见日益脆弱，而以欧亚大陆互联互通为基础的能源合作网络，则呈现为更加稳定、更具韧性的替代方案。在这一语境中，软实力已不再只是理念传播或价值吸引，而是与支撑其运作的大环境—能源基础设施和互联互通网络紧密结合、不可分割。
中国与俄罗斯一同否决了联合国安理会一项关于重新开放霍尔木兹海峡的决议（图源：新华社）
乌克兰冲突与叙事转型
乌克兰冲突已成为全球叙事竞争的核心舞台。这不仅是一场军事冲突，更是一场围绕合法性、主权及国际秩序方向的斗争。
俄罗斯将冲突定性为对北约东扩的回应，以及对其国家安全与文明自主性的捍卫。自冲突爆发以来，中国强调对话、反对制裁，并尊重各方的合理安全关切。
尽管两国立场并非完全一致，但都主张以多极化为国际秩序的重要组织原则和发展方向。
中方通过“一带一路”倡议，深化与东盟、非洲、拉美等全球南方地区的经济合作，削弱了以西方为中心的外交框架主导地位，客观上有利于俄罗斯拓展乌克兰冲突之后被严重削弱的外交空间。
乌克兰冲突由此加速软实力转型为认知体系的博弈：竞争各方不再仅仅影响舆论，而是争夺合法性本身的定义权。
媒体生态系统：作为叙事基础设施的今日俄罗斯、中国国际电视台、金砖国家电视台
今日俄罗斯（RT）、中国国际电视台（CGTN）、金砖国家电视台（TV BRICS）等媒体平台的创新与发展，标志着全球政治中替代性叙事体系走向制度化。
作为俄罗斯的多语种广播电视网，RT旨在通过提供国际事件的另类解读，挑战西方媒体垄断。其核心目标并非实现全球吸引力，而是为全球信息流动引入叙事多元性。尽管在西方舆论场引发争议，RT仍是放大俄方全球议题观点的战略传播工具。
金砖国家电视台（TV BRICS）是近年的新兴产物，体现新兴经济体的集体传播需求。与国别属性的 RT 不同，TV BRICS 是连接俄、中、印、巴、南非的多边媒体平台，标志着从单边叙事输出向去中心化、分布式叙事生产的转型。
中国CGTN为这一生态增添独特视角。作为全球多语种媒体平台，将发展叙事、联通叙事、稳定叙事整合为连贯传播战略。其在北美、欧洲、非洲、东南亚、拉美的布局，契合中国在“一带一路”框架下，将传播嵌入经贸与基础设施合作的整体战略。
RT、CGTN与TV BRICS共同构成了一种新兴的媒体生态，正在改变西方媒体体系的主导地位。在这一格局中，媒体不再仅仅是传播渠道，而成为塑造全球认知结构的地缘政治基础设施。
北极：战略公域与新兴的合作性竞争
北极地区日益成为合作与竞争并存的重要舞台。气候变化开辟了新的航道和资源获取途径，使该地区对全球贸易与能源体系具有战略意义。
俄罗斯拥有最长的北极海岸线和丰富的资源蕴藏，在北极治理中占据核心地位。中国将自身定位为近北极利益攸关方，并通过科学研究、航道探索以及与“一带一路”倡议中“冰上丝绸之路”相关的基础设施投资，积极参与北极研究和治理。
中俄在北极的合作涵盖能源勘探、科研协作以及沿北方海路的航道开发。对俄罗斯而言，中国的参与为北极开发提供了投资与基础设施支持。对中国而言，北极航道为全球航运体系提供了多元化的潜在选择，并减少了对传统海上要道的依赖。
从软实力角度看，北极合作构建了科研协作与全球公域治理的叙事。然而，这些叙事也受到西方国家的压力，说明软实力在竞争中面临的挑战。
北极航运契合中国的“冰上丝绸之路”构想，是共建“一带一路”倡议在北极海域的延伸。中国的北极规划与俄方的北方海航道发展议程高度契合（图源：新华社）
“一带一路”倡议作为叙事基础设施
“一带一路”倡议可谓中国全球软实力建设的一大成就，它不仅是一项基础设施工程，更是一个通过互联互通重新定义全球化的系统性框架。
通过铁路、港口、能源管道和数字基础设施，“一带一路”构建了长期的经济相互依存模式，这些模式产生了叙事效应。互联互通成为国家发展的必选模式，基础设施则成为一种话语权力。
俄罗斯通过欧亚经济联盟与“一带一路”之间的协调参与这一体系，尤其是在能源走廊、中亚互联互通及北极开发等领域。这种对接强化了更广泛的欧亚一体化逻辑，挑战了以西方为中心的全球化模式。
纵观所有案例，可清晰看到以下规律：中俄并非仅开展传统软实力建设，而是构建叙事、基础设施与制度相互强化的系统性环境。
霍尔木兹冲突塑造的能源体系、乌克兰冲突的叙事博弈、RT/CGTN/TV BRICS媒体生态，共同印证了全新影响力形态的诞生。笔者认为，这一形态可被定义为战略叙事权力——物质实力与阐释权力深度融合的产物。
结论：软实力的重构
中俄软实力协作正在揭示软实力进化的一个重要变化：它不再只是依靠文化传播、媒体影响或价值观吸引，而是越来越与基础设施建设、国际传播网络和地缘政治合作结合在一起，成为一种更综合的战略能力。
从霍尔木兹海峡引发的能源安全问题，到乌克兰危机中的叙事竞争；从RT、CGTN和TV BRICS等国际媒体平台，到北极合作和“一带一路”建设，都体现了这一趋势。这些单独或协作的实践表明，中俄并非只是回应西方长期占据主导地位的话语体系，而是在尝试构建一套新的国际互联互通、信息传播和全球治理框架。
这种新模式最终会推动更加稳定的多极世界，还是会加剧国际体系的分化，目前仍有待观察。但可以确定的是，在中俄的实践中，软实力已经不再只是文化影响力，而是深入嵌入基础设施、传播网络、制度合作和国际秩序建设，成为塑造全球规则和国际认知的重要战略工具。
英文原文如下：
Introduction: From Classical Soft Power to Strategic Narrative Competition
The concept of soft power, as originally formulated by Joseph Nye, refers to the ability of a state to shape the preferences of others through attraction rather than coercion. In the post-Cold War era, Western states, particularly the United States and Europe, established a dominant position in global soft power through their control over media ecosystems, cultural industries, higher education, and multilateral governance institutions.
However, the structural environment in which soft power operates has changed dramatically since the mid-2010s. The Ukraine crisis of 2014, the intensification of US–China strategic rivalry, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the subsequent fragmentation of global supply chains have all contributed to the securitisation of interdependence. In this context, soft power is no longer primarily about cultural attractiveness or ideological appeal; it has become deeply embedded in geopolitical competition and systemic resilience.
Within this shifting environment, China and Russia have developed increasingly coordinated approaches to external communication and global narrative construction. Their cooperation does not replicate Western models of soft power; it reflects a different conceptual foundation, one grounded in sovereignty, multipolarity, and state-led governance of information and infrastructure systems.
Theoretical Reframing: Soft Power as Narrative, Institution, and Infrastructure
To understand the transformation of China–Russia soft power cooperation, it is necessary to move beyond the traditional dichotomy between soft and hard power. In practice, contemporary influence operates through a triadic structure that integrates narrative authority, institutional design, and material infrastructure.
Narrative power refers to the ability to shape how global events are interpreted, particularly during moments of crisis. Institutional power refers to participation in and construction of alternative governance frameworks such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and China’s Global Development, Security, Civilisation and Governance Initiatives. Infrastructure power refers to the ability to shape connectivity systems, including energy pipelines, transportation corridors, digital networks, Arctic routes, etc.
In the China–Russia context, these dimensions are increasingly intertwined. Infrastructure shapes narratives, narratives justify institutions, and institutions reinforce infrastructure. This structural fusion becomes particularly visible in geopolitical arenas such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the Arctic, and across Eurasian connectivity projects under the Belt and Road Initiative.
The Strait of Hormuz and the Geopolitics of Energy Narrative Power
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most strategically sensitive maritime chokepoints in the world, through which a significant share of global oil and liquefied natural gas exports flow. Escalating tensions involving Iran, the United States, and regional actors have repeatedly highlighted the fragility of global energy security systems.
Within this context, China and Russia converge in their interpretation of energy security as a politically constructed rather than a purely market-driven phenomenon. Russian discourse emphasises the destabilising effects of Western military interventions in the Middle East and the consequences of sanctions-based energy governance. China, while maintaining a more neutral diplomatic position, consistently emphasises the diversification of energy supply chains and opposition to unilateral coercive measures.
This convergence is reinforced by structural complementarities. Russia, as a major hydrocarbon exporter under Western sanctions, increasingly depends on Asian markets for energy exports. China, as the world’s largest energy importer, has systematically diversified its supply routes through pipelines from Russia and Central Asia and through maritime and overland corridors developed under the Belt and Road Initiative.
China’s long-term energy strategy is particularly relevant in this context. Over the past decade, it has significantly expanded its strategic petroleum reserves, accelerated the development of renewable energy systems, and invested heavily in electric vehicle infrastructure and battery technologies. These structural adjustments have reduced vulnerability to maritime chokepoints such as Hormuz. At the same time, Russia has benefited from more stable long-term demand conditions in Asian markets.
Thus, the Hormuz crises have functioned as catalysts for reinforcing a shared China–Russia narrative of energy multipolarity. In this narrative, Western-controlled maritime security frameworks are portrayed as increasingly unstable, while Eurasian energy connectivity is presented as a more resilient alternative. Soft power in this context is inseparable from the material infrastructure that underpins it.
The Ukraine Crisis and the Transformation of Legitimacy Narratives
The Ukraine conflict represents a watershed moment in contemporary international relations and has become a central arena of global narrative competition. It is not only a military conflict but also a struggle over legitimacy, sovereignty, and the meaning of international order.
Russia frames the conflict as a response to NATO expansion and as a defence of its national security and civilisational autonomy. Chinese official discourse, while maintaining neutrality, consistently emphasises dialogue, opposition to sanctions, and the importance of respecting the legitimate security concerns of all parties.
Although these positions are not identical, they reflect a shared scepticism toward the Western normative monopoly in global governance. Both China and Russia emphasise multipolarity as an alternative organising principle of the international order.
China’s role in this context has expanded beyond diplomatic positioning. It has increasingly strengthened engagement with the Global South through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and expanded economic cooperation with ASEAN, Africa, and Latin America. These engagements have helped reduce the dominance of Western-centred diplomatic frameworks and have indirectly provided Russia with broader diplomatic space in non-Western regions.
The Ukraine crisis has therefore accelerated the transformation of soft power into a contest between epistemological systems. Competing actors are no longer merely influencing opinions; they are competing over the definition of legitimacy itself.
Media Ecosystems: RT, CGTN, and TV BRICS as Narrative Infrastructure
The evolution of media platforms such as RT, CGTN, and TV BRICS reflects the institutionalisation of alternative narrative systems in global politics.
RT, as a Russian multilingual broadcasting network, is designed to challenge Western media dominance by providing alternative interpretations of international events. Its role is not necessarily to achieve universal attraction but to introduce narrative plurality into global information flows. Despite controversies in Western discourse, RT functions as a strategic communication instrument that amplifies Russian perspectives in global debates.
TV BRICS represents a more recent development, reflecting the collective communication ambitions of emerging economies. Unlike RT, which is nationally rooted, TV BRICS operates as a multilateral media platform connecting Russia, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. It represents a shift from unilateral narrative projection to distributed narrative production.
China’s CGTN adds a different dimension to this ecosystem. CGTN operates as a global multilingual media platform that integrates development narratives, connectivity narratives, and stability narratives into a coherent communication strategy. Its expansion in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America reflects China’s broader strategy of embedding media presence within economic and infrastructural engagement under the Belt and Road Initiative.
Together, RT, CGTN, and TV BRICS form an emerging triadic media architecture that challenges the historical dominance of Western media systems. In this configuration, media is no longer merely a communication channel but a form of geopolitical infrastructure that shapes global perception structures.
The Arctic: Strategic Commons and Emerging Cooperative Competition
The Arctic region has become an increasingly important arena for both cooperation and competition. Climate change has opened new shipping routes and resource access, making the region strategically significant for global trade and energy systems.
Russia, possessing the longest Arctic coastline and extensive resource endowments, occupies a central position in Arctic governance. China, while geographically distant, identifies itself as a near-Arctic stakeholder and has expanded its engagement through scientific research, shipping exploration, and infrastructure investment linked to the Ice Silk Road component of the Belt and Road Initiative.
China–Russia cooperation in the Arctic includes energy exploration, scientific collaboration, and shipping route development along the Northern Sea Route. For Russia, Chinese participation provides investment and infrastructure support for Arctic development. For China, Arctic routes offer potential through the diversification of global shipping systems and reduced dependence on traditional maritime chokepoints.
From a soft power perspective, Arctic cooperation constructs narratives of scientific collaboration and global commons governance. However, these narratives are increasingly constrained by securitisation pressures from Western Arctic states, revealing the limits of soft power in highly militarised environments.
The Belt and Road Initiative as Narrative Infrastructure
Beyond discrete case studies, the Belt and Road Initiative itself represents a central mechanism of China’s global soft power transformation, with indirect but significant implications for Russia. BRI is not merely an infrastructure project; it is a systemic framework for redefining globalisation through connectivity.
Through railways, ports, energy pipelines, and digital infrastructure, BRI constructs long-term patterns of economic interdependence that generate narrative effects. Connectivity becomes a form of legitimacy, and infrastructure becomes a form of discourse.
Russia participates in this system through coordination between the Eurasian Economic Union and BRI, particularly in energy corridors, Central Asian connectivity, and Arctic development. This alignment reinforces a broader Eurasian integration logic that challenges Western-centric globalisation models.
Synthesis: Toward Strategic Narrative Power
Across all examined cases, a consistent pattern emerges. China and Russia are not merely engaging in traditional soft power projection, they are constructing a systemic environment in which narratives, infrastructure, and institutions are mutually reinforcing.
Energy systems such as those shaped by Hormuz volatility, conflict narratives such as the Ukraine conflict, media ecosystems such as RT, CGTN, and TV BRICS, Arctic cooperation, and the Belt and Road Initiative collectively demonstrate the emergence of a new configuration of influence. This configuration may be conceptualised as strategic narrative power, in which material capabilities and interpretive authority converge.
Conclusion: Soft Power Reconfigured
The future of China–Russia soft power cooperation lies in its transformation into a structurally embedded system that integrates infrastructure, communication, and geopolitical alignment. Soft power is no longer a separate domain of cultural attraction; it has become inseparable from the material architecture of global order.
The Strait of Hormuz, the Ukraine crisis, media ecosystems such as RT, CGTN, and TV BRICS, Arctic cooperation, and the Belt and Road Initiative together illustrate this transformation. China and Russia are not merely responding to Western soft power dominance; they are actively constructing alternative systems of meaning, connectivity, and governance.
Whether this emerging system leads to stable multipolarity or deeper fragmentation remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that soft power in the China–Russia context has already evolved into something fundamentally different: a strategic narrative system embedded in the infrastructure of global politics itself.